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We use data from a unique, nationally representative survey to investigate the relationship between job 
satisfaction and employment characteristics in Chile. Consistent with the dualistic models, job protection 
appears to be a positive determinant of job satisfaction rather than a cost to be avoided by engaging in 
informal activities. Further, we find self-employed workers to be penalized by the lack of valuable 
workplace facilities, such as decent toilets and clean water. However, being self-employed does not 
necessarily mean taking the ‘bad’ jobs. We show that self-employed workers in Chile, like their 
counterparts in industrialized countries, derive procedural utility from being independent. 
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Employment is certainly one of the most important dimensions of life. Not only does it represent the 
primary source of income for most people in the world, but also a large part of our lifetime is spent 
working. Furthermore, employment can grant a sense of fulfillment and dignity (Sen and ILO, 1975). 
The economic research on happiness has shown that unemployed individuals are substantially less 
satisfied with their life than workers (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Therefore, it is extremely important for 
policymakers to understand individuals’ employment preferences in order to improve labor market 
conditions.  
 
In this respect, traditional approaches to labor market indicators have two main weaknesses (Lugo, 
2007). First, they mainly focus on quantitative, outcome-oriented aspects of employment, such as wages 
and hours of work. Thus, by disregarding the qualitative and procedural characteristics of working life, 
they fail to give a full representation of labor market conditions. Second, even when labor force data are 
collected at an individual level, they usually do not contain extensive information on household 
characteristics. These shortcomings are of particular relevance to developing countries, where informal 
employment and poverty are predominant. This raises the need to design and test alternative indicators 
of employment characteristics, which ought to be collected at an individual level and whose respective 
questions should be included in household questionnaires.  
 
An emerging literature on industrial countries addresses some of these issues by analyzing subjective 
wellbeing data related to employment. Job satisfaction is indeed becoming an increasingly popular 
subject in the economic literature as it is found to be relevant to understanding  individuals’ behavior 
and to predict labor market mobility (Freeman, 1978; Clark, 2001).  
 
Economists have been particularly interested in investigating the relationship of job satisfaction with 
other economic variables, including unionism (Borjas, 1979; Meng, 1990), income and education (Clark 
and Oswald, 1996),  and job security (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999; Clark, 2001).  
 
Among the determinants of job satisfaction, self-employment stands out. There is consistent evidence 
within and across Western and Non-Western industrialized countries that self-employed workers are 
more satisfied with their jobs than employees, even after controlling for socio-demographic and 
economic characteristics (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1997; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; 
Blanchflower, 2000; Blanchflower et al., 2001).  
 
Some studies go even further by identifying what the factors are behind the utility premium from self-
employment. The results consistently show that the greater job satisfaction reported by the self-
employed is due to procedural preferences for independence (Eden, 1975; Hamilton, 2000; Hundley, 
2001; Benz and Frey, 2008a; 2008b). Workers attribute positive intrinsic value to independence as 
compared to hierarchy, at least in the employment sphere.1 This finding raises the question of why the 
share of self-employment in industrial countries is still low. The mainstream literature suggests that 
credit constraints represent the major barrier of entry to self-employment for workers in industrial 
countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998).  
                                                 
1 However, economists are just starting to study procedural utility. Given the studies available so far, it might be too soon for 
a generalization of the results to all individuals. For instance, Fuchs-Schündeln (2009) provides some evidence that 
procedural preferences for independence are heterogeneous across the population. This makes our study even more 
interesting because it might well be that workers from non-industrialized countries do not value procedural utility from 
independence.  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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Alas, because of data constraints, the existing literature on job satisfaction mainly focuses on the 
industrialized world.2 There is no reason to believe that these findings should necessarily hold in the 
developing world. The traditional dualistic view of the labor market in developing countries suggests 
quite the opposite. Being self-employed implies having the ‘bad’ jobs, with a low wage and no job 
protection. Working in the self-employment sector is not seen as a voluntary choice but as the only 
option left to workers who are rationed out of salaried employment.3 This view emphasizes the 
importance of income and job protection in increasing workers’ utility, but leaves no role for procedural 
utility from independence and empowerment at work.  
 
Some recent studies have started to question this dualistic view of the relationship between formal and 
informal sectors in developing countries, with interesting results (Maloney, 1999; 2004; Fajnzylber et al., 
2006; Falco et al., 2010). More specifically, Maloney (1999) identifies two factors that may deter workers 
from choosing formal wage work. First, labor protection laws usually have an implicit tax on workers, 
namely that non-wage benefits are compensated by a lower wage. It could well be that workers prefer to 
evade these implicit taxes by engaging in informal activities. Because of its rigidities and monetary costs, 
job protection is not necessarily seen as a positive determinant of job satisfaction. Second, consistent 
with the procedural utility argument, workers might be attracted by other characteristics of informal 
work, such as flexibility and independence. In contrast with the dualistic view, entering the informal 
sector is mainly seen as a voluntary choice of the worker. The study by Fajnzylber (2006) on Mexican 
workers’ mobility provides additional evidence in favor of this argument.  
This paper uses a unique, nationally representative data set, designed and collected by the Oxford 
Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), to investigate the relationship between job 
satisfaction and employment characteristics in Chile. The data set is based on a multi-topic survey, and 
as such, it has a unique advantage: in addition to the standard demographic and socio-economic 
variables already present in the CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional), it 
contains detailed information on both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of employment (Lugo, 
2007), agency and empowerment (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007), physical safety (Diprose, 2007), and 
subjective wellbeing (Samman, 2007). This allows us to construct and test several indicators of quality of 
employment, including job protection, occupational hazard, and independence/empowerment at work. 
 
The picture of informal employment that emerges from this analysis is somewhat of a compromise 
between the different theories just described. Consistent with the dualistic theory of labor markets, job 
protection appears to be a positive determinant of job satisfaction rather than a cost to be avoided by 
engaging in informal activities. Further, we find self-employed workers – especially those with own-
account businesses – to be penalized by the lack of valuable workplace facilities, such as decent toilets 
and clean water.  
 
On the other hand, working in the informal sector, and especially being self-employed, does not always 
mean taking the ‘bad’ jobs. We find that after controlling for either job protection or occupational 
hazard, self-employed workers are significantly more satisfied with their jobs than employees. The self-
employment utility premium fully disappears once we control for self-determination/empowerment at 
work. This provides evidence that Chilean workers have procedural preferences for independence just as 
their counterparts in industrial countries do. Finally, if we account for heterogeneous self-employment, 
we find that the self-employed who are also ‘employers’ report a higher job satisfaction than employees 
                                                 
2  In the cross-countries study from Benz and Frey (2008b), the sample includes Bangladesh and the Philippines. However, 
they only have a limited number of control variables (age, gender, education, income, and hours of work). Hinks (2010) 
investigates some determinants of job satisfaction in South Africa; however, informal employment and self-employment 
are excluded from the analysis.  
3 See for instance Harris (1970), Tokman (1978), and more recently Chandra (1993).  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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regardless of income, job protection, and occupational hazard. Taken together, these results cannot 
exclude that some workers self-select into the informal sector.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the data. In section three, we define 
the indicators of quality of employment and provide the descriptive statistics. Section four focuses on 
the empirical results. Section five presents some robustness checks by addressing endogeneity issues and 
the problem of heterogeneity in the self-employment sector. Section six concludes.  
II. The Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a national representative survey in Chile, which was designed and 
collected by OPHI in 2008–2009 with the intention of testing the missing dimensions modules on a 
national scale.4 The data set is a sub-sample of 2,000 households from the 2006 CASEN survey. In 
addition to the standard demographic and socio-economic variables already present in the CASEN data 
set, the survey contains detailed information on qualitative employment, empowerment, subjective 
wellbeing, and physical safety.   
 
All questions, except for those related to subjective wellbeing, are addressed to a single member of the 
household – the respondent – who answers for all the other members. For obvious reasons, the 
respondents only answer the questions related to subjective wellbeing for themselves.  
 
The data set contains information on 7,952 individuals, of whom 3,161 are employed. Among those, 
1,348 were asked about their job satisfaction. Only eight individuals out of 1,348 did not answer the 
question. We then need to exclude those individuals for whom we lack some information about their 
demographic or socio-economic characteristics. This leaves us with a sample of about 1,100 workers. As 
is the case for most developing countries, self-employment represents approximately 31 per cent of total 
employment, which is a large share compared to approximately 10 per cent in industrial countries. The 
self-employment dummy variable takes the value ‘one’ when workers state to be either self-employed or 
employers/bosses and ‘zero’ when workers are employed by an organization, whether public or private.5  
 
Self-reported job satisfaction is the dependent variable of our empirical analysis. Individuals are asked 
the following question: ‘In general, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with your job?’ Answers have to 
belong to one of the four categories: ‘Very satisfied’, ‘Fairly satisfied’, ‘Not very satisfied’, and ‘Not at all 
satisfied’. We recoded the answers so that ‘four’ reflects the highest job satisfaction category and ‘one’ 
the lowest job satisfaction category.  
 
Unlike previous works on industrial countries, we have an exhaustive number of control variables. In 
addition to the standard controls – which include age, tenure, gender, size of the firm, hours of work, 
income, region, education, industry, occupation, and self-employment – we also have information on the 
qualitative characteristics of employment: job protection, occupational hazard, and direct measures of 
procedural utility.6 These indicators of quality of employment, along with self-employment, represent 
the main explanatory variables of our model.  
                                                 
4 Detailed information on OPHI’s data set and survey modules can be found on the OPHI website.  
5 Individuals working as domestic servants are included among the employees. However, their exclusion from the sample 
does not affect the results. In contrast, unpaid relatives and armed/security forces are excluded from the analysis given 
their particular status. This choice does not affect the results, as only eight observations belong to these categories in total.  
6  Correlations among the explanatory variables are very low. None exceed 0.4. The correlation table is available upon 




III. Indicators of Quality of Employment and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The purpose of this section is to explain how these indicators have been constructed and to provide 
some descriptive statistics.  
Job Protection 
Job protection refers to the formal arrangements that characterize an economic activity with the aim of 
protecting workers against negative shocks related to employment (Lugo, 2007). For instance, the 
retirement pension system protects workers against the consequences of age, whereas paid sick leave 
protects workers against the consequences of illness, and so on. Job protection is negatively related to 
job informality. By definition, informal jobs are the ones that lack job protection.7  
 
In our data set, there are six dummy variables reflecting job protection. We constructed a dummy 
variable equal to one for each of the following situations: 
 
  Individual has a work contract 
  Contractual relation is permanent rather than temporary 
  Individual (man or woman) is entitled to paid maternity leave  
  Individual is entitled to paid sick leave 
  Individual is entitled to paid holidays 
  Individual contributes to retirement pension 
 
By definition, self-employed individuals do not have any job protection except for voluntary 
contributions to retirement pensions. This means that most descriptive statistics about job protection 
refer to employees, whereas the comparison between the job protection of employees and the self-
employed is based purely on the contribution to retirement pension dummy variable.  
 
The descriptive statistics confirm that informal wage employment is a widespread phenomenon in Chile. 
Only 40 per cent of employees have full job protection (i.e., all six dummy variables equal one), and 11 
per cent of employees have no job protection at all (i.e., all dummy variables equal zero). If we look at 
each dimension of job protection separately, we find that ‘maternity leave’ and ‘length of contract’ are 
the most frequent types of job informality. Thirty-three per cent of female employees are not entitled to 
a paid maternity leave and 34 per cent of employees have temporary contracts.  
 
We now compare the share of individuals who contribute to a retirement pension in the self-
employment and wage employment sector. It is worth mentioning that Chilean employees (in the formal 
sector) must contribute at least 10 per cent of their wages to a retirement pension, whereas contributing 
to a pension is voluntary for self-employed workers. Not surprisingly, descriptive statistics show that 
self-employed workers contribute significantly less to retirement pensions than employees. Only 30 per 
                                                 
7 Job protection must be distinguished from job security, which is typically used in the existing literature on industrial 
countries. Job security, at least as it is defined by Blanchflower (1999), refers to people’s perceptions about the probability 
of losing their job. One can expect job security and job protection to be positively correlated. However, the latter includes 
additional dimensions, and it is not a subjective, reported variable. Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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cent of the self-employed contribute to retirement pensions, compared to the 83 per cent of the 
employees (see Table 1 below). This difference is significant at the 99 per cent level.  
 
Table 1: Raw mean Differences between Employees and the Self-employed 
 Self-employed  Employees 
Contribution to pension  0.297***  0.831 
 (0.017)  (0.007) 
Lack of facilities  0.310***  -0.139 
 (0.059)  (0.282) 
Heavy work  -0.0139  0.056*** 
 (0.052)  (0.031) 
Accident 0.030  0.062*** 
 (0.006)  (0.005) 
Job satisfaction  2.750  2.762 
 (0.048)  (0.029) 
Autonomy 3.297***  2.753 
  (0.048) (0.035)
Competence 3.104***  2.800 
 (0.062)  (0.041) 
Relatedness 3.344** 3.271
 (0.029)  (0.020) 
 
Note: Unweighted means Significance levels: 0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
An important question is whether the observed lack of job protection represents a voluntary choice of 
the affected workers, or whether it has been imposed by some external constraints. It might well be that 
some employees prefer temporary jobs or that most self-employed individuals do not want to contribute 
to a retirement pension. However, it could also be that some employees have no other choice than to 
accept an informal job and that some external constraints prevent most self-employed from contributing 
to a retirement pension. We try to shed some light on this issue in the next section.  
Occupational Hazard 
Occupational hazard refers to poor health and safety conditions in the workplace. As far as we know, no 
detailed economic study establishes a linkage between occupational hazards and job satisfaction. 
Furthermore, data information on occupational injuries is rather limited and usually restricted to ‘insured 
employees’ (Lugo, 2007).  
 
In our data set, five dummy variables reflect occupational hazards. We constructed a dummy variable 
equal to one for each of the following situations.  
 
  Individual suffered any accidental injury, illness, disability, or other mental health problem 
caused by work during the past twelve months  
  Individual’s workplace does not have adequate toilets 
  Individual’s workplace does not have clean water 
  Individual has to work in uncomfortable postures or spend long hours standing 
  Individual is exposed to cutting or grinding machines, loud noise, extreme temperatures, 
harmful chemicals, or heavy loads (workplace exposures) 
 
The descriptive statistics suggest that 30 per cent of workers face no occupational hazards at all (that is, 
all dummy variables equal zero), and only 0.45 per cent of the workers face full occupational hazard (i.e., Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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all dummy variables equal one). If we look at each variable separately, it is clear that the dimensions 
‘exposures’ and ‘uncomfortable postures’ are very frequent in Chilean workplaces. Nearly 50 per cent of 
Chilean workers face such types of occupational hazards compared to nearly 12 per cent who do not 
have access to adequate toilets or clean water and compared to 5 per cent who had a work-related injury.  
 
Next, we want to compare occupational hazards between self-employed workers and employees. In 
order to do that, we first run a factor analysis of the five dummy variables representing occupational 
hazards. The results suggest the existence of two factors. The dummy variables for lack of toilets and 
lack of clean water load most heavily on factor one. We call this factor ‘lack of facilities’. The dummy 
variables for uncomfortable postures and workplace exposures load higher on factor two. We call this 
factor ‘heavy work’. The dummy variable ‘work-related injury’ is kept separately because it is poorly 
correlated with the rest of the variables. These two factors explain 80 per cent of the four variables’ 
combined variance.8  
 
Table 2: Factor Analysis of Occupational Hazard  
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1  1.85239  0.53612  0.4631  0.4631 
Factor 2  1.31627  0.74222  0.3291  0.7922 
Factor 3  0.57405  0.31677  0.1435  0.9357 
Factor 4  0.25728  .  0.0643  1.0000 
 
Note: Principal component factors. LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 1367.39 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances: 
Variable Factor  1  Factor  2  Uniqueness 
Exposures 0.4585  0.7061  0.2912 
Lack of clean water  0.8487  -0.3896  0.1279 
Lack of adequate toilets  0.8673  -0.3435  0.1298 
Uncomfortable postures  0.4119  0.7401  0.2825 
 
We now investigate whether there is any significant difference between the self-employed and employees 
(see Table 1 above). On the one hand, self-employed workers are on average more likely to lack 
workplace facilities compared to employees. This difference is significant at the 99 per cent level. On the 
other hand, employees are on average more likely to do heavy work and to have an accident, injury, or 
illness due to work. These differences are significant at the 99 per cent level. We conclude that the self-
employed and employees are affected by different types of occupational hazards. Employees are more 
likely to do dangerous and heavy work, whereas the self-employed are more likely to lack decent 
workplace infrastructures.  
 
Procedural Utility from Independence 
Utility can be derived not only from outcomes but also from the conditions and the processes which 
lead to outcomes (Frey et al., 2004). For instance, individuals attribute positive intrinsic value to 
independence as compared to hierarchy. They enjoy the freedom of doing what they like rather than 
being subject to decisions made by others. The mainstream economic literature has taken self-
employment as an important case for independence in working life. Unlike employees, self-employed 
                                                 
8 If we add the dummy variable for “work related injury” in the factor analysis, only 65% of the five combined variables’ is 
explained by the two factors.  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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workers are not subject to a hierarchy and thus do not have to obey orders given by their superiors. This 
‘taste for independence’ seems to account for the higher job satisfaction reported by the self-employed 
compared to employees in industrialized countries. We test whether this is also true in Chile. Following 
Benz and Frey (2008a), we introduce direct measures of procedural utility from independence in the job 
satisfaction regression. If it is true that the self-employment utility premium – provided that it also exists 
in Chile – is due to procedural utility from independence, then the effect of self-employment on job 
satisfaction should disappear once we control for such procedural aspects of work.   
 
Procedural utility is derived from the fulfillment of a psychological need for what psychologists call ‘self-
determination’ (Deci and Ryan, 2000). According to psychological research, self-determination is 
strongly correlated with independence, and it is usually restricted under hierarchy. Within development-
related social sciences, self-determination can be associated with ‘empowerment’. Ibrahim and Alkire 
(2007) underline the instrumental and intrinsic importance of empowerment for impoverished 
communities. This paper tests whether Chilean workers value empowerment at work.  
 
OPHI’s modules contain extensive information on individuals’ empowerment and self-determination, 
both at the workplace and at home (Alkire, 2007; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007; Samman, 2007). We derive 
our direct measures of procedural utility from independence through the three components of self-
determination that have been found to be of crucial importance for human wellbeing (Deci and Ryan, 
2000): autonomy, competence, and relatedness.  In order to assess autonomy, individuals are asked to choose 
from one to four (where ‘one’ is ‘Not true at all’ and ‘four’ is ‘Completely true’) how true the following 
statement is: ‘At work I have a lot of autonomy and I can organize myself as I want.’ In order to assess 
competence, individuals are asked: ‘To what extent do you feel that you have the possibility to progress and 
improve at work?’ Answers must belong to one of the four following categories: ‘Always,’ ‘Frequently,’ 
‘Occasionally,’ or ‘Never.’ We recoded the answers so that ‘four’ reflects the highest category and ‘one’ 
the lowest category. Finally, individuals are asked three questions about relatedness, namely, about their 
relationship with the people with whom they regularly interact. Again, the answers are ranked from one 
to four, where ‘four’ represents the highest degree of relatedness. Our relatedness variable is constructed as 
an average of the answers to the three questions just mentioned.  
 
We now compare the reported job satisfaction and self-determination/empowerment at work between 
the self-employed and employees (see Table 1 above). Some interesting results arise. Unlike in 
industrialized countries, there is no significant positive difference in the mean of reported job 
satisfaction between the self-employed and employees. On average, self-employed workers report 0.012 
index points (on a scale of one to four) lower satisfaction with their job than employees – although the 
difference is not significant. This seems to partly contradict the dualistic view of labor markets in 
developing countries. If self-employment is merely a sort of disguised unemployment, self-employed 
workers should be on average less satisfied with their jobs than employees.9  
 
In contrast, the raw differences for each of the three components of self-determination show 
significantly higher self-determination for self-employed workers. On average, self-employed workers 
report 0.544 index points higher autonomy, 0.304 index points higher competence, and 0.073 higher relatedness 
than employees (on a scale of one to four). These differences are all very significant.  
 
                                                 
9 This is true unless the share of informal wage employment is so large as to significantly decrease the overall average job 
satisfaction of the employees. This would only imply that working in the informal wage employment sector is worse than 
self-employment.  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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To summarize, descriptive statistics suggest that self-employment work is associated with a higher level 
of workers’ self-determination than wage work. However, this difference is not reflected in higher job 
satisfaction. Two explanations can be given to this evidence. Either Chilean workers have no procedural 
preferences for independence as their counterparts in industrial countries do, or the self-employment 
utility premium is offset by the lack of job protection and workplace facilities. In the latter case, the data 
should not reject the hypothesis that job protection and workplace facilities are positive determinants of 
job satisfaction. We investigate this issue in our regression analysis.  
IV. Empirical Findings 
 
Multivariate regressions are estimated using an ordered logit model (the results do not change if we use 
the stereotype logit model, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), multinomial logit model or the logit model).  
 
We start by running a standard regression in which we do not control for the qualitative characteristics 
of employment. The aim is to compare our results with the empirical evidence from industrialized 
countries. Findings are presented in Table 3, column 1.  
 
Table 3: Ordered Logit Regression Results 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep.Variable:Job 
satisfaction 
Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit 
      
Self-employment 0.419*  0.597**  0.557** 
  (1.73) (2.37) (2.15) 
Lack of facilities  -  -0.308***  - 
   (-3.02)   
Heavy work  -  0.037  - 
   (0.45)   
Work-related injury  -  -0.321  - 
   (-0.97)   
Contribution to pension  -  -  0.537 ** 
     (2.35) 
Size of the firm       
    6–9 persons  0.693*  0.688*  0.587 
  (1.94) (1.95) (1.60) 
   10–49  0.193  0.262  0.085 
  (0.79) (1.05) (0.33) 
   50–199  0.275  0.337  0.139 
  (1.02) (1.24) (0.50) 
   >200  0.547**  0.588**  0.420 
  (2.02) (2.19) (1.45) 
Log net income  0.824***  0.791***  0.750*** 
  (6.32) (5.89) (5.48) 
Hours of work  0.007  0.008*  0.008 
  (1.50) (1.655) (1.55) 
Gender (male)  -0.421**  -0.352*  -0.363* 
  (-2.02) (-1.81) (-1.89) 
Age 0.038  0.018  0.015 
  (1.01) (0.52) (0.38) 
(Age)
2  -0.0002 -0.00005  0.0003 
  (-0.60) (-0.15)  (0.08) 
Tenure -0.040*  -0.035  -0.036 




2  0.001** 0.0009*  0.0009 
  (2.01) (1.91) (1.61) 
Region (urban)  -0.368*  -0.340*  -0.339* 
  (-1.84) (-1.67) (-1.67) 
Education dummies  5 categories  5 categories  5 categories 
Industry dummies  7 categories  7 categories  7 categories 
Occupation dummies  9 categories  9 categories  9 categories 
      
Log pseudolikelihood  -144276.45  -141673.47  -141151.73 
Observations 1107 1097 1095 
 
Note: Weighted ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
Income is certainly a major determinant of job satisfaction (p-value=0.000), as it is in industrial 
countries. In contrast, Chilean workers do not seem to care about hours of work. The coefficient on the 
self-employment dummy variable is positive but only marginally significant (p-value=0.084).10 This is 
not in line with the previous literature on industrial countries that consistently finds a highly significant 
utility premium from self-employment even after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and 
quantitative economic aspects of employment. We think that this low statistical significance can be 
attributed to our choice of disregarding qualitative aspects of employment that may be relevant for 
Chilean workers.  
 
The regression in Table 3, column 2, includes the three indicators for occupational hazard. The results 
suggest that the lack of facilities has a significant negative effect on job satisfaction (p-value=0.001). 
Surprisingly, heavy work and work-related injury do not seem to affect job satisfaction.11 This might be the 
result of wage-compensating differentials. However, we find no evidence that heavy and dangerous work 
is compensated by a higher wage.  
 
It stands out that after controlling for occupational hazards, the positive coefficient on the self-
employment dummy variable has become very significant (p-value=0.018). This finding supports the 
argument that the self-employment utility premium also exists in developing countries, but it may be 
offset by the lack of decent infrastructures that characterizes self-employment activities.  
 
We now look at the job protection indicator as measured by the contribution to retirement pension dummy 
variable.12 Occupational hazard indicators are temporarily excluded from the regression. The regression 
in Table 3, column (3), shows that contributing to a retirement pension is a positive determinant of job 
satisfaction. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 95 per cent level (p-value=0.019). Chilean 
workers who contribute to retirement pensions are on average more satisfied with their job than those 
who do not, everything else being equal. Furthermore, after controlling for job protection, the self-
employment utility premium emerges more strongly. The positive coefficient on the self-employment 
dummy variable increases in size and becomes significant at the 95 per cent level (p-value=0.032). This 
suggests that some external constraints are likely to prevent self-employed workers from contributing to 
a retirement pension. Under the assumption of full rationality, if the self-employed chose not to 
                                                 
10 The result is not very robust, either, as in the OLS and logit regressions the coefficient is not significant.   
11 However, it is worth mentioning that in the OLS, logit, and multinomial logit regressions the coefficient on the ‘work-
related injury’ dummy variable is negative and significant at the 95 per cent level.   
12 We do not use the other indicators of job protection in order to avoid multicollinearity problems. Indeed, by definition, 
self-employed individuals do not have an employment contract and are not entitled to the non wage benefits such as paid 
maternity leave, paid holiday, and paid sick leave.  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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contribute to a retirement pension because they did not value it, adding such an indicator in the job 
satisfaction regression should not have any effect on the self-employment dummy variable. Our results 
suggest, instead, that the lack of job protection that characterizes the self-employment sector reduces the 
job satisfaction of the self-employed.  
 
In order to verify the effects of the remaining job protection variables on job satisfaction, we run a 
regression using only a sub-sample of employees. The factor analysis of the six variables reflecting job 
protection suggests the existence of only one factor composed of all variables but length of contract. This 
factor, which we call job protection, explains 70 per cent of the five variables’ combined variance.13  
 
Table 4: Factor Analysis of Job Protection  
Factor Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1  3.56689  2.97189  0.7134  0.7134 
Factor 2  0.59500        0.19300  0.1190         0.8324 
Factor 3  0.40199  0.15867            0.0804         0.9128 
Factor 4  0.24332        0.05052            0.0487         0.9614 
Factor 5  0.19280  .  0.0386  1.0000 
 
Note: Principal component factors. LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)=4993.17 Prob>chi2 = .0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances: 
Variable Factor  1  Uniqueness 
Having a contract  0.8739 0.2363   
Paid sick leave  0.9107        0.1706  
Paid holidays 0.8459 0.2845   
Paid maternity leave  0.7578  0.4257   
Contribution to pension  0.8271        0.3159   
 
The regression results are reported in Table 5, column 1. The coefficient of the job protection indicator 
is positive and very significant (p-value=0.001). On the other hand, having a permanent rather than a 
temporary contract does not affect job satisfaction.  
 
Taken together, these findings reject the argument that individuals choose to work in the informal sector 
to avoid labor protection laws. An exception can be made for the length of contract: according to the 
data, it might well be that some workers voluntarily choose temporary jobs because, for example, they 
offer greater flexibility.  
 
Table 5: Direct Test for Procedural Utility 
 
  Sample of employees  Sample of all workers         
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep. Variable: Job satisfaction  Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit 










                                                 
13 If we also include length of contract, the explained combined variance drops to 63 per cent.  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
15 
 
















Job protection  0.450*** 
(3.44) 
- - 
Length of contract (permanent)  0.196 
(0.86) 
- - 
Autonomy -  -  0.177** 
(1.99) 
Competence -  -  0.281*** 
(3.79) 
Relatedness -  -  0.593*** 
(4.28) 











   (1.61) 






































Firms‘ size dummies  5 categories  5 categories  5 categories 
Education dummies  5 categories  5 categories  5 categories 
Industry dummies  7 categories  7 categories  7 categories 
Occupation dummies  9 categories  9 categories  9 categories 
      
Log pseudolikelihood   -87501.601  -138882.91  -120682.16 
Observations 733  1082  981 
 
Note: Weighted ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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In the next step, we include both the occupational hazard and job protection indicators in the full 
sample regression (see Table 5, column 2). Consistent with the previous regressions, the positive 
coefficient on contribution to retirement pension is still significant at the 95 per cent level (p-value=0.021) and 
the negative coefficient of lack of facilities is still significant at the 99 per cent level (p-value=0.004). As far 
as self-employment is concerned, when we control for both job protection and occupational hazards, the 
self-employment dummy variable coefficient increases and becomes significant at the 99 per cent level 
(p-value=0.008). This is consistent with hypothesis that the self-employment utility premium may not 
appear in the raw differences because it is offset by poor job protection and by the lack of facilities that 
characterize self-employment activities. Our final step is to investigate whether the observed positive 
relationship between self-employment and job satisfaction is due to procedural utility from 
independence.  
 
We now run a direct test for procedural utility by including the indicators of the three components of 
self-determination in the job satisfaction regression. The results are reported in Table 5, column 3. It 
stands out that the coefficient on the self-employment dummy variable is no longer significant (p-
value=0.209). This means that the self-determination or empowerment experienced at work explains the 
self-employment job satisfaction effect completely. Furthermore, the coefficients on autonomy, competence, 
and  relatedness are positive and highly significant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that, 
conditional on income, job protection, and workplace facilities, Chilean self-employed workers are more 
satisfied with their job than Chilean employees because they derive procedural utility from 
independence.  
V. Robustness Checks 
Heterogeneous Self-Employment 
One could claim that self-employment in a developing country can be very heterogeneous. Employers – 
namely individuals who have their own firm and invest in external sources of labor – are expected to 
face different labor market conditions than self-employed individuals who only use their own labor to 
engage in professional activities or run small family businesses. To some extent, Chilean employers are 
more comparable to the self-employed from industrial countries, whereas self-employed workers with 
own-account businesses are more likely to live under very poor and precarious conditions. Therefore, 
the dualistic theory of labor market is more likely to apply. We address this issue in the following 
empirical analysis.  
 
The design of the survey allows us to make the distinction between different types of self-employment. 
When asked about their main occupation, individuals have to choose between different categories: 
employer/boss, self-employed, and several types of dependent employment. Sixty-four workers selected 
employer/boss and 353 selected self-employed. In the previous regressions, these two types of workers 
were grouped together to form the self-employment category. We now use two distinct dummy 
variables: an employer dummy variable that takes the value ‘one’ when the workers select employer/boss, 
and an own-account business dummy variable taking the value ‘one’ if the workers select self-employed. 
Workers who are employed by an organization, either public or private, represent the reference group.  
 
The raw mean differences of reported job satisfaction corroborate the hypothesis of large heterogeneity 
in the self-employment sector. Consistently with the dualistic models, self-employed workers with own-
account businesses report 0.116 index points lower job satisfaction than employees (on a scale of one to 
four). On the other hand, consistently with the mainstream literature on industrialized countries, self-Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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employed workers who are also employers report 0.556 index points higher job satisfaction than 
employees. These differences are significant at the 95 per cent and 99 per cent level, respectively.  
 
We investigate whether the observed discrepancy between the job satisfactions reported by different 
types of self-employed workers is due to the low income, lack of job protection, and large occupational 
hazard, which affect the own-account businesses in particular. Regression 1 in Table 6 suggests that this 
is indeed the case. Once we control for income, occupational hazards, and job protection, the positive 
coefficient on the own-account business dummy variable becomes almost significant at the 95 per cent level 
(p-value=0.053). Not surprisingly, the employer dummy variable is also positive and significant at the 99 
per cent level.  
 
Taken together, these results confirm that the utility premium from self-employment also exists in Chile, 
but it is offset by the lack of income, job protection, and workplace facilities that characterize own-
account businesses.  
 Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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Table 6: Robustness Checks 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dep. Variable: Job  satisfaction  Ordered Logit      Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit 
























Savings  - - -  -0.062 
(-0.45) 
- 
Financial  insecurity  - - -  -  -0.820*** 
(-4.12) 


















































Personal  characterisitcs  controlled controlled controlled  controlled controlled Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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Firms‘ size dummies  5 categories 5 categories 5 categories 5 categories 5 categories
Education dummies  5 categories  5 categories  5 categories  5 categories  5 categories 
Industry dummies  7 categories  7 categories  7 categories  7 categories  7 categories 
Occupation dummies  9 categories  9 categories  9 categories  9 categories  9 categories 
Log pseudo likelihood  -143912.71  -136153.24  -135783.14  -126161.77  -130763.89 
Observations  1107 1076 1076  1022 1051 
 
Note: Weighted ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *0.05<p<0.1, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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Endogeneity 
In this section we ask to what extent our basic results are robust to endogeneity issues. The main 
concern is the potential endogeneity of the self-employment variable. We could have omitted some 
important characteristics of the workers that are correlated with being self-employed, in particular 
‘happiness’. Self-employment is more risky than wage earning. This means that individuals decide to 
enter the self-employment sector based on the expected returns from being self-employed. The latter 
depend on the subjective probabilities that individuals assign to the different self-employment outcomes. 
Happier individuals are more likely to be (over-)optimistic and thus to attribute larger probabilities to 
better outcomes. As a result, happier people are more likely to choose self-employment. Not 
surprisingly, happier workers are also more likely to report a higher job satisfaction.  
 
To address this issue, we run the same analysis as above, controlling for reported happiness. Individuals 
were asked ‘Taking all things together would you say you are: very happy, fairly happy, not very happy, 
or not at all happy?’ We recoded the data so that ‘four’ represents the larger degree of reported 
happiness. Regression 2 in Table 6 shows that self-employment remains very significant even after we 
control for happiness. This also holds if we account for heterogeneous self-employment (see regression 
3 in Table 6).  
 
We now explore whether other determinants of self-employment identified by the literature could 
potentially be correlated with job satisfaction.14 The mainstream theories of self-employment view 
attitudes towards risks (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979), managerial skills (Jovanovic, 1982), and access to 
capital (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), as being the primary factors in determining whether one chooses 
self-employment. The main reason to doubt that these factors are what drive our results is that they 
would all act through the happiness channel. Being skilled may raise happiness, which in turn increases 
job satisfaction. A similar argument applies to risk preferences and access to capital. In the regressions in 
Table 6, the effects that any other omitted variable could have on job satisfaction through the happiness 
channel are controlled for. As far as access to capital is concerned, we also address the issue by 
controlling for workers’ savings. We find no correlation with job satisfaction, and the self-employment 
variable remains very significant (regression 4 in Table 6). 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the endogeneity of the self-employment variable is inconsistent with 
the dualistic theory of labor markets. The fact that workers self-select in the self-employment sector 
according to some unobservable characteristics contradicts the view that self-employment is not a 
voluntary choice but the only option left to those who cannot obtain formal employment. Therefore, 
even if self-employment were somehow endogenous, this would not go against our findings.  
 
We now turn our attention to the job protection indicator and in particular to the contribution to retirement 
pension variable. As we mentioned in section three, an important question is whether individuals 
voluntarily choose not to contribute to a retirement pension or whether they face some external 
constraints. Our empirical analysis reveals a strong positive correlation between job satisfaction and 
contributing to a retirement pension, which is inconsistent with the assumption that individuals prefer to 
engage in informal activities. However, this result is not sufficient to claim that contributing to a 
retirement pension has a direct causal effect on job satisfaction. There could be some relevant omitted 
variables that are correlated with contributing to a retirement pension. For instance, if workers’ incomes 
                                                 
14 Clearly, one of the best ways to address the endogeneity issue is to do an instrumental analysis. Alas, although we have 
information about family background, race, and religion – which Hout (2000) identifies as determinants of self-
employment in the United States – the latter are found to be poorly correlated with the self-employment dummy variable 
in our Chilean sample.  Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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are just enough to cover basic expenses, financial constraints could prevent workers from contributing 
to a retirement pension. In this case, what reduces job satisfaction might be the precarious financial 
situation, rather than the lack of job protection. In order to test whether this is the case, we add an 
additional variable to our regression which is a proxy for financial insecurity. Individuals were asked: ‘If a 
household member lost their job, would your household have enough savings to go by three months 
without someone from the household getting a job?’ We use a dummy variable equal to one if 
individuals’ answer is no. Results from regression 5 in Table 8 show that financial insecurity does indeed 
reduce job satisfaction. However, the coefficient in the contribution to retirement pension variable is still 
significant.  
 
A different explanation could be that workers who are engaged in criminal or illegal activities are less 
likely to contribute to a retirement pension and to report a high job satisfaction. We try to address this 
issue by looking at our data on physical security, but we find no correlation with a contribution to a 
retirement pension. Therefore, we cannot completely exclude this hypothesis. However, if there are any, 
workers engaged in criminal or illegal activities represent an extremely small minority. Therefore, it is 
very unlikely that they can account for the observed relationship between contributing to a retirement 
pension and job satisfaction.  
 
Finally, one could be concerned that reverse causation accounts for the observed relationship between 
job satisfaction and empowerment/self-determination. In other words, workers who are more satisfied 
with their jobs tend to feel more empowered. While we cannot exclude that job satisfaction increases 
self-determination, the causal relationship must go in both directions. If empowerment were fully 
determined by job satisfaction, controlling for it should not have any effect on the self-employment 
dummy variable, whereas the significance level of the self-employment variable goes from the 99 per 
cent level to non-significant. From a theoretical point of view, this suggests that reported 
empowerment/self-determination is strongly linked with some job aspects which characterize the self-
employment sector and which increase job satisfaction – such as independence and flexibility.  
V. Conclusions 
 
This paper uses a unique, nationally representative data set to investigate the relationship between 
employment characteristics and job satisfaction in Chile. We find that in addition to income, Chilean 
workers have preferences for job protection, workplace facilities – such as adequate toilets and clean 
water – and independence/empowerment at work. The results satisfy many robustness checks. This 
suggests that qualitative and procedural characteristics of employment can be valuable to workers as 
quantitative, outcome-oriented indicators. 
 
As far as the debate on the role of the informal sector in developing countries is concerned, workers’ 
desire for independence can potentially deter them from entering the formal wage employment sector in 
favor of the self-employment sector. The picture of the self-employment sector that emerges from this 
empirical analysis is far from being as negative as the one depicted by the traditional dualistic view. The 
self-employment sector has both desirable (independence) and undesirable characteristics (lack of job 
protection and of decent infrastructures), which appear to compensate each other, so that overall, 
Chilean self-employed workers are as satisfied with their jobs as Chilean employees. Furthermore, we 
also find that having temporary rather than permanent working contracts does not affect job satisfaction. 
Thus, overall, we cannot exclude the possibility that at least some workers self-select into the formal and 
informal sector according to their respective preferences. 
 
Nevertheless, this study also points out the large heterogeneity in the self-employment sector. Self-
employed workers with their own businesses are the most penalized by the lack of job protection and of Cassar   Revsisiting  Informality 
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workplace facilities, so their unconditional job satisfaction is lower than that of any other group. On the 
contrary, the findings relative to Chilean employers are consistent with the evidence from industrial 
countries: the utility premium from self-employment appears unconditionally of income, job protection, 
and occupational hazard. This suggests that some of the insights from the mainstream literature can also 
be applied to the developing world.     
 
Important recommendations emerge from this study for both policymakers and future research. There is 
an urgent need to collect data on the qualitative and procedural dimensions of employment, which 
appear to be relevant for individuals. This is especially true for developing countries, where informal 
employment is predominant. This will not only increase our understanding of labor market conditions 
but will also facilitate comparisons among countries. Finally, qualitative employment characteristics such 
as job protection, workplace safety, and empowerment at work, should be taken into account when 
planning and evaluating policies against poverty.   
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Appendix: Variable Description 
 
  Age: age of the individuals at the time of the interview.  
  Education: dummy variable for level of education completed. Base category: primary education. 
  Employer: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual’s primary occupation is as 
the owner of a firm. 
  Financial insecurity: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individuals’ households 
would not have enough savings if one of the members lost their job.  
  Happiness: ordered variable that takes values from one to four, where four represents the 
highest happiness category and one the lowest happiness category. 
  Hours of work: number of weekly working hours in the main occupation.  
  Job protection: factor analysis, see section three.  
  Job satisfaction: ordered variable that takes values from one to four, where four represent the 
highest job satisfaction category and one the lowest job satisfaction category. 
  Occupational hazard: factor analysis, see section three. 
  Own-account business: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual’s primary 
occupation is self-employment. 
  Salaried wage (log): logarithm of the last net monthly income from main occupation.  
  Savings: ordered variable that takes values from zero to two, where zero represents ‘no 
savings’, one represents ‘savings below 750.000 pesos’, and two represents ‘savings above 
750.000 pesos’.  
  Self-determination/empowerment at work: see section three.  
  Self-employed earnings (log): logarithm of the sum of the last monthly income from main business 
and the market values of products from the main business which have been used for personal 
or household consumption.  
  Self-employment: dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual’s primary occupation 
is self-employment or the individual is the owner of a firm. 
  Size of firm: dummy variable for the number of people in Chile working in the firm which 
corresponds to the main occupation. Base category: from one to five individuals.  
  Tenure: number of years the individuals had their current job at the time of the interview. 
  Type of industry: dummy variable for type of industry based on the ISIC Rev.2 classification.  
  Type of occupation: dummy variable for type of occupation based on the ISCO 88 classification.  
  Zone: dummy variable that takes value one if the individual lives in an urban zone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 